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TALKING ABOUT HARASSMENT
Vicki Schultz*
I am delighted to be here with such a distinguished and
wonderful group of people to celebrate the thirty-fifth anniversary
of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. It is a
great opportunity for all of us to talk to each other about what has
been happening in the field of sex harassment law.
I do not think it is fair to say, as some people have suggested,
that the fundamental rethinking of harassment law that is going on
right now is a backlash against women, or feminists.1 There are
many feminists and gay rights activists and queer theorists of good
will who are going back to square one to figure out whether
harassment law is doing the work it should be doing.2 I am such
* Professor, Yale Law School; Evelyn Green Davis Fellow, Bunting
Fellowship Program, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, 2000-2001. 1 would
like to thank the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review for inviting me
to appear on this panel, which was chaired brilliantly by Professor Janet Halley.
I would also like to thank my fabulous research assistant Jamie Kohen for her
able assistance with sources.
l Catharine A. MacKinnon, Harassment Law Under Siege, N.Y.TIMES, Mar.
5, 1998, at A29 ("The insidious argument that sexual harassment law turns 'all
sex into harassment' epitomizes the current backlash."). Cf. Tamar Lewin, Debate
Centers on Definition of Harassment, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al
(describing the so-called "Seinfeld" case, see infra note 45, as an apparent case
of backlash against sexual harassment law); Kate Zernike, A New Sexual
Harassment Dynamic, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 1998, at Al (describing the
current backlash of men filing harassment claims).
2 See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN 190-96 (1995) (criticiz-
ing earlier theories of harassment for protecting "good girls" from sexual
advances, rather than placing all women in charge of their own sexual desire);
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169, 1205-12 (1998) (criticizing earlier theories of harassment for negating
women's sexual agency); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual
Harassment? 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 729-62 (1997) (criticizing earlier theories
of harassment for neglecting same-sex sexual harassment).
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a person.3 I have come to believe that we need to fundamentally
change the way we think about harassment. In my view, we need
to move away from the model that has prevailed over the last
twenty years. In an earlier work I have referred to this model as the
sexual desire-dominance model,4 but today I am going to call it
the sexual model for short.
Under the sexual model, the quintessential case of harassment
involves a powerful, typically older male boss who makes unwant-
ed sexual advances toward a less powerful female subordinate. The
Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy, the Tailhook incident, the
Stroh's Brewery lawsuit, the Paula Jones case - in fact, almost all
of the harassment cases that have been publicized widely in the
news media - conform to this sexual model.5 I have come to
believe that this is a fundamentally misguided way to think about
sex harassment. It has taken me a great deal of time and effort to
come to this position, and I have only a few minutes today to talk
to you about why.
One problem with the sexual model is that it is top-down;
indeed, the entire conception of dominance and subordination that
is used in some of the literature is top-down.6 Top-down models
3 In both the scholarly and popular literature, I have developed a fundamen-
tal critique of one version of sex harassment law. See generally Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L. J. 1683 (1998) [hereinafter
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment]; Vicki Schultz, Sex Is the Least
of It: Let's Focus Harassment Law on Work, Not Sex, THE NATION, 19 Vol. 266,
May 25, 1998, at 11; see also Ellen Yarosnefsky, More Than Sex: Why the
Courts Are Missing the Point; An Interview with Vicki Schultz, MS. MAGAZINE,
May 1998, at 56-61.
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1692-711.
5 For a description of how Hill-Thomas, Tailhook, and the Stroh's cases
conformed to the sexual paradigm, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, supra note 3, at nn. 19-45 and accompanying text; see also Jones v.
Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), aff'd, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681
(1997).
6 See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 137 (1989) (arguing that "sexuality is the dynamic of control by which
male dominance - in forms that range from intimate to institutional, from a look
to a rape - eroticizes and thus defines man and woman, gender identity and
sexual pleasure" and that sexuality is "that which maintains and defines male
supremacy as a political system"). Cf Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above
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assume that power follows from formal roles and that it flows from
those who occupy higher positions down onto those who occupy
lower positions. Yet power is not always contained in formal
structures, and it can circulate in many unexpected directions. In
the workplace, many women (and men) experience horizontal
harassment that involves exclusion by peers, not simply vertical
harassment that involves coercion from bosses. Indeed, the day-to-
day interactions through which co-workers create relationships that
mark some people as insiders and other people as outsiders are a
crucial part of the dynamic that sustains sex segregation and
hierarchy in the workplace. Harassment is not always about who is
on top and who is on bottom; it is also about who is "in" and who
is "out."
I want to move our legal and cultural understanding of sex
harassment toward a model that places exclusion from work, rather
than abuse of sexuality, at the forefront. The sexual model treats
harassment as a way for men to use work to appropriate sex from
women. But we can also see harassment as a way for men (or
women) to use sex to appropriate work for themselves. Some men
resort to sexual assault, along with other behaviors that intimidate
and exclude women, as a way to claim the best jobs as masculine
terrain.
Work is one of the most important distributional goods that
exists in our society; it provides the foundation for citizenship,
economic security, community, and self-esteem.7 Indeed, work is
central to most people's sense of themselves,8 including their sense
All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (proposing
a framework for evaluating sex discrimination based on eradicating the
subordination of women to men).
' I discuss these issues in more detail in a recent essay. See Vicki Schultz,
Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000). For references to the literature
documenting the significance of work, see id. at 1886-92, 1908-10, 1930-3 1; see
also William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1, 19-21, 90 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of work to equal citizenship);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 530-33 (1997) (describing the importance of work to
personal identity, community, and equal citizenship).
8 For a more thorough elaboration of this point, see Schultz, Life's Work,
supra note 7, at 1890-91.
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of themselves as men or women. So, it should not surprise us that
some men will try to monopolize good jobs to safeguard their
economic superiority and to secure their manly identities. Male
workers can define their jobs as the domain of those who are
suitably "masculine," for example, by driving away the women and
even men who do not fit the projected masculine image, or by
marking those who remain as different and inferior.
Once we make this shift away from the sexual model toward a
work-centered model, we can see many issues through a different
lens. Take, for example, the issue of sex segregation and harass-
ment among school children. I once wrote an article in which I
argued that occupational segregation by sex - or, the sex-type of
the work people do as adults - cannot be attributed to sexism in
early childhood socialization. 9 The standard explanation for
occupational segregation is that people are raised to prefer jobs that
are coded as "feminine" or "masculine" - girls want to be nurses,
boys want to be doctors - and they just follow in that trajectory
when they grow up. I hope I persuaded some readers that this
explanation fails: most people end up doing jobs that have very
little to do with what they thought they would do when they were
children, and the sex-type of the jobs to which they aspire as
children does not predict the sex-type of the jobs they hold as
adults. I still insist that I was right about that point.
But I do think I failed to appreciate how early in life the
process of shaping gender identity by claiming certain activities as
"masculine" (or "feminine") begins. I now have a four-year-old,
and I have spent a lot of time in preschools and on playgrounds. I
have seen first-hand how some groups of children try to claim
certain play activities and playspaces as gendered, in the same way
that some adults try to claim lines of work and workplaces as
gendered. For example, at my daughter's preschool, when the
teachers created a fantasy play structure that was a construction
site, a group of the older boys claimed the site as a "boys"' space
9 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising
the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1798-839 (1990)
(arguing that early childhood socialization toward femininity and masculinity
cannot explain the sex segregation of employment among adults).
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and coded construction as a "boys"' activity. Whenever the girls
entered the site, these boys warned them away or ostracized them
by hitting them, pressing their toy power tools against them, calling
them "stupid," and refusing to play with them. Before long, even
the girls who loved to play with construction toys at home
internalized the message that, at school, construction was not for
them. Although I have been amazed (and dismayed) to observe this
process occur among young children, in hindsight I suppose it was
predictable. Play serves the same functions for children that work
serves for most adults. Through play, children explore their world,
bond with others, obtain social recognition, express their creative
energies, and develop their sense of themselves. So, just as work
is one of the main activities through which people create their
senses of themselves as (certain kinds of) "men" and "women," so,
too, play is a central medium through which children begin to
define themselves as (certain kinds of) "boys" (in this case, "bad
boys") and "girls." Through this process, the psychological and
institutional habits of exclusion begin. Once we see children's
interactions from this perspective, it seems clear that we should be
more concerned with these non-sexual, exclusionary patterns of
behavior than with some of the comparatively benign, sexually
themed incidents that have captured the attention of the schools and
the national news media.1°
We should focus our energy on the same sorts of patterns of
gender-based exclusion among adults in our nation's workplaces.
This is one of my major critiques of the sexual model: it has led
courts and commentators to focus obsessively on sexual conduct,
while deflecting our attention away from arguably more common,
non-sexual forms of gender-based hostility and abuse that women
(and many men) endure every day in workplaces all over the
country. For my Yale Law Journal piece, I read hundreds and
hundreds of harassment cases - almost every lower federal court
sex harassment hostile environment case that was decided between
'0 See, e.g., Cynthia Gomey, Teaching Johnny the Appropriate Way to Flirt,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., June 13, 1999, at 43 (describing an incident in which a
schoolboy shapes a milk bag into a replica of a penis). Gomey also describes an
incident in which a North Carolina school suspended a six-year-old boy for
kissing a girl classmate on the cheek. Id. at 45.
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the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Meritor" and its 1993
decision in Harris,12 as well as a large random sample of cases
decided thereafter.13 Over and over again, I kept seeing the same
pattern: when women entered fields that had been defined tradition-
ally as "men's work," some of the men became very threatened by
the women's presence.14 These men did all sorts of things to drive
the women away or to mark them as less competent. The cases
involve everything from genuine assaults - such as shoving file
cabinets onto the women, pulling knives on them, or hitting,
kicking and groping them 5 - to everyday micro-aggressions -
such as excluding the women from social interactions and train-
ing,' 6 or picking on them constantly.'7 Work sabotage is incredi-
" Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing for the
first time that a sex-based hostile work environment constitutes a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII).
12 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
13 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1710
n. 127 (describing methodology).
"4 This pattern is well documented in my earlier article. See Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1721-32, 1758-62
(describing harassment cases that conform to this pattern and reviewing the
sociological and ethnographic literature that documents and explains this
phenomenon). Many cases decided after the article was published still conform
to this pattern. See, e.g., Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Intern, Inc., 227 F.3d
179 (4th Cir. 1999) (female automotive factory worker); Smith v. Sheahan, 189
F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999) (female guard at jail); Williams v. General Motors
Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999) (female factory worker); Richmond-Hopes
v. City of Cleveland, 168 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1998) (female electric meter service
installer); Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999)
(female insurance salesperson).
"5 See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D.
Fla. 1990), aff'd, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991) (male technician held a knife
to plaintiffs throat, shoved her into a file cabinet, threatened to bang her head
into the ground, and grabbed her pelvic area and breasts); Kirkland v. Brinias,
741 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), affid, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991) (fifty-
year-old male busboy hit, kicked, and sexually groped the waitresses); see also
Kirstin Dowley Grimsley, A Hostile Workplace: Into an Abyss of Sex Harass-
ment At Eveleth Mine, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at A01 (male miner slashed
a gash in female miner's pant leg, drawing blood; another pressed his body
against a female miner and then put his hands around her throat).
16 See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509,
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bly common.1 8 In some cases, men actually altered work machin-
ery in ways that threatened women's safety; one woman had a hole
drilled in her arm. 19 In less dramatic cases, men stole women's
case files,2° overburdened them with work, and engaged in more
mundane activities to create the impression that the women were
not doing their jobs well and did not belong there.2 ' In some
540-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (involving a law firm associate who claimed that she was
denied the opportunity to work on large complex cases and was subsequently
denied partnership on the ground that she lacked the capacity to handle such
matters); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993) (involving a
construction technician who claimed that she was denied the opportunity to
obtain construction experience in the field); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798
F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving an auto mechanic trainee who claimed
that she was denied the ability to learn to do brake repair and was subsequently
fired on the ground that she was not productive at such work).
17 See, e.g., Cross v. Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,
49 F.3d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1995) (psychiatric facility employees referred to
as "rather dumb," "stupid," or "just a woman"); Davis v. Boeing Helicopter Co.,
No. 88-0281, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11990, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1990)
(involving a female aircraft assembler who was promoted to electrician and who
claimed that her supervisor "harassed her and made it impossible for her to
complete her work by checking her progress every few minutes"); Turley v.
Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (foreman harassed
female employee by "picking on [her] all the time" and treating her differently
from the male employees).
"8 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1713-
28, 1734-38, 1748-55.
'9 See MARY MARTIN, HARD-HATrED WOMEN: STORIES OF STRUGGLE AND
SUCCESS IN THE TRADES 33-34 (1988) ("[The men] didn't want the women to
replace them, so they pulled stunts. Someone cut the chain holding up a big
motor mount I was welding. It fell down on me and burned my arm to the
bone."); id. at 257 ("I had to start checking all the parts on my machine because
Dick would loosen stuff on it, which could kill you.").
20 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1473 (3d Cir. 1990)
(black female police officer contended her coworkers stole or hid her case files
in an attempt to harass her).
2 See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 910 (1st Cir.
1988) (reporting an allegation that a coworker "had falsified a medical record in
an attempt to create the impression that the plaintiff and [another employee] had
mishandled a case"); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 233
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving female
firefighters who were inadequately trained by officers who instead set out
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settings, of course, men resorted to sexual assaults and crude sexual
advances to threaten the women and undermine their perceived
professionalism. But in most cases, such sexual misconduct was
part of a larger pattern to exclude the women or to communicate
the message that they are different or inferior.
The sexual model has created another related problem. It
encourages people to think of harassment as a form of behavioral
misconduct in which individual bad actors engage, rather than as
a set of social relations that are embedded in a larger context of
structural inequality in the workplace. As a result, sex harassment
policies have become stand-alone policies that are completely
divorced from the larger policies designed to achieve gender
integration. I did some research a couple of years ago and inter-
viewed a number of managers and management consultants. Almost
all of them defined sex harassment primarily, if not exclusively, in
terms of sexual misconduct. They had adopted isolated policies and
procedures for dealing with sex harassment, rather than dealing
with it as an aspect of a broader anti-discrimination program.
Unfortunately, they did not see eradicating harassment as part of a
larger, more affirmative project of creating a company culture that
is gender-integrated and welcoming to both sexes. These findings
were surprising to me, because harassment is really just a type of
deliberately to undermine their physical capacity to do the job, and then
terminated them at the end of their probation period); Beeman v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 724 F. Supp. 674, 675 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (reporting an allegation by a
female grocery store manager that her boss harassed her by "making daily checks
upon her work, . . . belittling her performance, . . . reprimanding her in
meetings that lasted up to three hours .... making long lists of things for her to
do, ... [and] asking her to accomplish work tasks that were impossible to
accomplish within the allotted time"); Downum v. City of Wichita, 675 F. Supp.
1566, 1569-70 (D. Kan. 1986) (involving a female firefighter who claimed she
was rushed through training to be a dispatcher and made to do the job before she
was ready); Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I.
1982) (plaintiffs coworkers sabotaged her work and "always... tried to make
her do her work poorly"); Accardi v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 297
(Ct. App. 1993) (reporting a female police officer's allegation that her
department undercut her performance by "deliberately overburdening her with
double work assignments; denying assistance when she requested it; [and]
deliberately circumventing established procedures when she was assigned to duty
as a court officer in order to make her work more difficult").
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discrimination. The whole concept of hostile work environment
harassment emerged when judges realized that after many compa-
nies had ceased discriminating overtly, more covert barriers to
integration had emerged. Rather than managers refusing to hire
racial minorities or women, they could simply look the other way
while incumbent workers drove the newcomers away.22 Once we
understand that harassment is just a subtle type of discrimination
designed to maintain traditional patterns of segregation, it seems
clear that harassment policies should be integrated into more
comprehensive organizational policies to achieve desegregation.
Such policies must take into account the specific history and
culture of the firm, the professional field in question, and the
particular job setting.
Rather than facilitating such a fine-tuned sociological approach,
the sexual model lends itself to a free-floating, trans-contextual
analysis. Defining sex harassment as a form of sexual violation -
the "unwelcome sexual advance" - that transcends the particular
organizational context makes it possible to essentialize the concept
of harassment. Such an approach can translate readily into the
proposition that men's sexual advances inherently violate women's
dignity or equality. There is reason to be concerned that this is
happening around the globe, as some nations have imported the
sexual model of harassment that is now being questioned by
feminists in the United States, and incorporated it into their own
legal and cultural traditions.23 Following close on the heels of
legal developments in the United States, for example, the European
Union took steps to condemn and outlaw workplace sex harassment
as a violation of women's dignity, while defining harassment in
sexual terms strikingly similar to those promulgated by the United
States EEOC.24 Austria passed a law that adopts both the sexual
22 This pattern of management acquiescence in co-worker harassment is
described in Martin, supra note 19; Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment:
Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 37-38
(1990).
23 See Vicki Schultz, Sexual Harassment, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 7-8 (forthcoming 2001).
24 See Mia Cahill, The Legal Problem of Sexual Harassment and Its
International Diffusion: A Case of Austrian Sexual Harassment Law, 10-11
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substantive definition and the privatized enforcement mechanisms
of the American approach; 25 France criminalized what we would
think of as quid pro quo harassment.26 These legal approaches
failed to connect harassment to a larger system of workplace
gender inequality that relegates women to inferior jobs; they simply
accept the gender segregation of work as a "neutral" background
condition rather than defining it as the structural context in which
harassment flourishes (and which it fosters).
I encountered this same lack of understanding when I taught a
session on sexual harassment at a conference on global constitu-
tionalism a few years ago at Yale.27 Apart from the one U. S.
Supreme Court Justice who was present,z8 many high-level jurists
from around the world simply did not appear to comprehend what
I was saying about the link between sex segregation of employment
and hostile work environment harassment. They viewed sex
harassment exclusively as a form of sexual imposition (akin to
rape), and many of them used legal discourses that defined sexual
advances against a woman as a violation of her basic human
dignity. Now, it's not that I don't believe sexual advances can ever
infringe on interests we might think of as dignitarian in nature; of
course they can.29 But to legally equate sexual advances toward
women with inherent violations of women's dignity strikes me as
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Law and Policy)
(showing that the European Union definition of sexual harassment relied greatly
on the definition from the EEOC guidelines, especially the emphasis on conduct
of a sexual nature).
25 Id. at 14-15, 22-23.
26 See Abigail C. Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France and the United
States: Activists and Public Figures Defend Their Definitions, in COMPARING
POLITIES AND REPERTOIRES OF EVALUATION IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED
STATES 19 and n.34 (Michele Lamont & Laurent Thevenot, eds., 2000)
(manuscript forthcoming, on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) [hereinafter
Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France].
27 Conference on Global Constitutionalism, Equality: International Norms,
Session on Sexual Harassment, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut,
1998.
28 Justice Stephen Breyer attended the conference, and he clearly understood
my point.
29 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111
HARv. L. REv. 445 (1997).
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a reductionist, potentially dangerous move that feminists should
evaluate very carefully.
A related problem with harassment law's focus on sexual
misconduct is that it invites inquiry into the sexual history and
sexual self-presentation of the person who was harassed. In current
harassment doctrine, for example, the law asks whether the sexual
advances or conduct were "unwelcome." Now, under a work-based
model of the type that I am advocating, we would not need such
an unwelcomeness standard, because it would make no sense to ask
whether someone had welcomed being subjected to an environment
that interfered with their ability to pursue their work. "Did the
harassee welcome being driven out of her job?" "Did she welcome
being made to look incompetent?" These are not questions that
would be on our radar screen. But once we have a model that
focuses on sexual advances and other sexual activity, we do have
to have something like an unwelcomeness standard because we
don't want to prohibit all sexual activity.
Some sexual advances and other forms of sexual activity are
desired and invited, even in the workplace. Yet, once we have an
unwelcomeness standard, we know from past experience that courts
will abuse it and allow inquiry into whether the victim behaved in
such a way as to welcome her own harassment.3" In the hostile
work environment context, there are shocking cases, such as one
case in which the court deemed a woman to have "welcomed" such
actions as having her head pushed in the toilet, being shocked with
a cattle prod, being maced, and being hit and punched in the
kidneys - simply because she had had the temerity to use profanity,
tell off-color jokes, flirt, and go without a bra.31 There is a
30 See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 826-35 (1991).
31 See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the "unwelcomeness" requirement was not met where a female jailer claimed
that she was "handcuffed to the drunk tank and sally port doors, ... that she
had chairs pulled out from under her, a cattle prod with an electrical shock was
placed between her legs, and that ... [she was] handcuffed to the toilet and her
face pushed into the water, and maced," all on the ground that she had used
profanity, told off-color jokes, engaged in sexual horseplay and flirting, and
failed to wear a bra underneath her T-shirt); see also Weinsheimer v. Rockwell,
754 F. Supp. 1559, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1990), affd, 949 F.2d 1162 (1 lth Cir. 1991)
(rejecting sexual harassment claim on the ground that the unwelcomeness
427
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problem when the victim has to meet an image of a Sunday school
teacher in order to win a harassment case.32 The law separates the
good girls from the bad girls, and punishes the latter.33
When the law has this sexual focus, it is not only women who
are harmed. The focus on rooting out unwelcome sexual advances
permits those who enforce the law to condemn not just bad girls,
but also other people whom our culture views as the walking
embodiments of dangerous or offensive sexuality. We can predict
who such people will be: women and men of color, working class
men and women, gay men and lesbians, bisexuals and transgen-
dered people, and other sexual minorities.34 The courts can deem
requirement was not met where plaintiff had engaged in sexual banter and joking
and had used "abusive and vulgar language" in speaking to her boyfriend on the
telephone at work).
32 I believe Anita Hill fell victim to this phenomenon. At first, her credibility
was high because she came across as a prim, school teacher type. Eventually,
however, "[h]er veracity, her motives, her private life, and even her sanity would
come under assault. It would require an intense effort, but Hill's apparently
pristine character would.., be completely transformed." JANE MAYER & JILL
ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 280 (1994).
By the time the Senate hearings were over, "[s]he had been portrayed as, among
other things, a political zealot, a sexual fantasist, a scorned woman, possibly a
closet lesbian, and a pathological liar who had lifted bizarre details from The
Exorcist in a desperate effort to destroy Thomas." Id. at 305.
'3 I have analyzed this problem in greater depth elsewhere. See Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1744-45.
34 See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV.
1695 (1993) (documenting the role of homosexual identity in the state's
regulation of sexuality); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992) (arguing that the regulation of sexuality threatens
reinforcing or increasing the social penalty accruing to disfavored sexualities).
Cf Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Supression,
72 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1119-20 (1994) (noting that, in the context of pornogra-
phy regulation, "judges, jurors, and most members of the public are likely to find
most explicit or 'deviant' sexual depictions repellant and view as degrading not
only sexual portrayals that descriptively, humorously, playfully, or ironically
depict subordinated women, but also those that are explicitly intended to
challenge that subordination"); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The"
Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1145-47 (1993)
(stressing that censorship of pornography would likely be used against
homosexuals, feminists, and those perceived to have deviant sexuality, and
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such people outside the bounds of legal protection extended to
harassees - or, worse yet, stigmatize them as harassers.
A good example of this kind of targeting of a sexual minority
is the double standard courts have adopted with respect to gay men
(or those presumed to be gay) in sex harassment cases.35 The
courts have characterized male bosses who make sexual advances
toward men as harassers, on the ground that the boss would not
have been attracted to and therefore would not have made a similar
advance toward a woman. This reasoning, of course, presumes that
the bosses are homosexuals who have desire only for men, and
uses that presumption as the basis for finding them guilty of sex
harassment.36 By contrast, however, the courts have almost never
reporting allegations that Canadian customs censors have singled out gay and
lesbian, as well as radical, bookstores).
31 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1777-
1785 (analyzing in detail this double standard); see also Kenji Yoshino, The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REv. 353 (2000)
[hereinafter Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract] (arguing that courts have set up
a two-tiered system of justice for homosexual and heterosexual harassers).
36 See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448
(6th Cir. 1997) ("When a male sexually propositions another male because of
sexual attraction, there can be little question that the behavior is a form of
harassment that occurs because the propositioned male is a male - that is,
'because of ... sex."'); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143
(4th Cir. 1996) ("We hold that a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual
harassment claim may lie under Title VII where a homosexual male (or female)
employer discriminates against an employee of the same sex or permits such
discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the same sex.");
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that same-sex sexual harassment claims could be actionable if and only
if the defendant is shown to be homosexual).
There is a more theoretical objection to this line of reasoning - indeed, to
the entire edifice of "but-for" reasoning that undergirds the cause of action for
quid pro quo harassment perpetrated by those presumed to be exclusively
heterosexual or homosexual. This "but-for" reasoning first emerged in early cases
involving heterosexual male supervisors who fired women who refused their
sexual advances. In these cases, the courts faced a dilemma: just what was it
about this situation that constituted discrimination "because of sex" within the
meaning of Title VII? Early courts held that the male supervisor's sexual
advance amounted to discrimination because of sex because the supervisor had
made an advance toward a woman that he would not have made toward a man.
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extended protection from sex harassment to gay men (or men who
are presumed gay), even when they are subjected to overt, gender-
based harassment at the hands of straight (or presumably straight)
men. 37 (I am talking about men here because most of the cases
with which I am familiar involve men. But I suspect that this
pattern would hold in cases involving women as well.)
38
This problem of the normalization of some kinds of sexuality
at the expense of others39 raises the prospect that the conventional
sexual model of harassment law may tread too heavily on free
expression - especially the sexual expression of unpopular groups.
Of course, this is a complex subject about which people of good
See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Although it may not
be obvious at first blush, this reasoning actually identifies as the source of sex
discrimination the sexual attraction or desire presumed to underlay the
supervisor's sexual advance. For, according to the courts' logic, the only reason
the heterosexual supervisor made an advance toward the woman that he would
not have made toward a man is that the supervisor felt an attraction or desire for
her that he would not have felt for a man. The courts applied the same logic to
male supervisors who made advances toward men who worked for them,
reasoning that the supervisors (who they presumed were homosexual) would not
have felt desire for and therefore would not have made advances toward women
- only for men. This reasoning is objectionable on many levels. As my colleague
Kenji Yoshino has pointed out, it negates the possibility of bisexual desire. See
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract, supra note 35. Even more fundamentally, one
might object, as I do, to the fact that it singles out sexual desire as the source of
legal prohibition - or, put colloquially, it outlaws desire.
" See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that harassment of a gay male employee by male co-workers and male
supervisor was not harassment "because of sex"); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, *15 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (male worker harassed
by male co-workers who thought he wasn't "macho" enough); see also Doe by
Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997) (man accused of being
gay harassed by straight male co-workers); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp.
1452 (N.D. I11. 1988) (same). For analyses that question and complicate the
courts' presumptions about the sexual orientations/desires of harassers and even
the harassees, see Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract, supra note 35.
38 See, e.g., Johnson v. Cmty. Nursing Services, 985 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Utah
1997) (female supervisor made sexual advance toward female employee); Myers
v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (same).
'9 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS,
AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999).
430
TALKING ABOUT HARASSMENT
will can disagree. But it is not only conservatives who should be
worrying about this issue;4" I believe feminists and liberals should
also be doing so.4" We should make sure that harassment law
does not give employers an incentive - or excuse - to fire ordinary
workers for engaging in benign sexual expression in the name of
protecting women.
Corporations have long had an incentive to suppress and control
sexuality in the workplace. With the emergence of Taylorism in the
early twentieth century, managers sought to sanitize their compa-
nies of emotionality and the other messy stuff of human life they
saw as interfering with the rational functioning of the firm:42
reproduction, birth, death, sickness, disease, love, and sexuality.
4 3
0 For some insightful analyses of this problem by conservative commenta-
tors, see Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Eugene
Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1791 (1992); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work
Environment" Harassment Law Restrict? 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997).
41 For some good analyses by scholars with a feminist perspective, see J. M.
Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295
(1999); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the
Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REv. 687 (1997).
42 Taylorism is a theory of management introduced by Frederick Winslow
Taylor, who introduced ideas of scientific precision into the world of worker
management. See John Fabian Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the
Law of Workplace Accidents, 107 YALE. L.J. 1467, 1488 (1998) ("Taylor
developed a series of new managerial techniques, including standardized and
minutely controlled processes of production and maintenance, and stopwatch
time-study to replace workers' informal know how with ostensibly scientific
rationality."); see also ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK
WINSLOw TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY (1997); ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 20-22 (1977).
" There is evidence that the old bureaucratic paradigm is in the process of
being replaced. See Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 7, at 1919-28
(documenting the shift from the old bureaucratic workplace to newer, more fluid
forms of work organization); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological
Contract at 3 (Jan. 31, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal
of Law and Policy) (discussing the shift to a new employment regime character-
ized by less employment security and more emphasis on "general skills training,
upskilling of jobs, networking opportunities and contact with firm constituents
for employees at all levels of the firm, micro-level job control, market-based pay,
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This same reasoning persists today. As I have heard many people
put it, "Well, of course we should eliminate sexual harassment,
because when people are at work, they have no business fooling
around; they should be working."'  Sex harassment law may
provide an extra push for management to ban sexual interaction
across-the-board, without worrying about whether it is welcome or
unwelcome (even though the company would not be held liable for
conduct that was not unwelcome). This incentive may explain why
we are beginning to see policies that are disturbing from a gender-
equality perspective: policies prohibiting men and women from
traveling together on business, policies preventing male supervisors
from meeting with their female staff behind closed doors, and even
policies prohibiting dating or sexual joking among employees.45
We need a feminist approach to sex harassment that avoids
these pernicious effects and articulates an alternative normative
vision. Even if we could banish all hints of sexuality from the
workplace - the place where we spend most of our waking hours
- this would not represent progress. On the contrary, I think it is
part of a feminist vision of progress to be able to express ourselves
freely and to be more fully human while we are at work. Now, of
course, we all have to respect other people, and we need to get
along well enough to work together to achieve common goals. But
we should not allow some people to censor what their co-workers
say simply because they are offended. When people are being fired
for sexual harassment simply because they show a dictionary
and firm-specific dispute resolution institutions for ensuring fairness"). It remains
to be seen whether the new, more fluid forms of work organization will take a
different approach to matters of emotionality, sexuality, and the like.
' Sociologist Abigail Saguy has documented a strand of American feminist
thought that also emphasizes this same productivity-oriented rationale for
regulating sexual harassment. See Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France, supra
note 26 at 15-16.
45 Tamar Lewin, Debate Centers on Definition of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1998, at Al (noting that some employers "have tried to de-sexualize the
workplace, adopting codes forbidding intra-office dating, touching or staring");
Kate Zernike, A New Sexual Harassment Dynamic, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18,
1998, at Al (noting that "companies have ruled out travel involving two
colleagues of the opposite sex" and many "have banned romantic relationships").
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46definition of the word "clitoris" to a female co-worker, we
should be concerned that feminism is being used in the service of
Fordism.
47
Feminists should aspire to do much more. We should aspire to
create a world in which people do not have to suspend our basic
humanity while we are at work. We should aspire to create a world
in which women as well as men, sexual minorities as well as those
in the sexual mainstream, can be perceived as sexual beings and
competent workers at the same time - a world where sexuality,
humanity, and authority coexist for all. To do this, we must create
workplaces in which women as well as men, people from all walks
of life, occupy the structural positions of equality and authority that
are necessary to endow us with us with the capacity to engage in
free and equal expression - including sexual expression.
I could say more about how my approach to harassment gets us
closer to these goals. The basic idea is to create a body of law that
gives companies the incentive to fully integrate their workplaces
along sex/gender lines, but does not spur them to censor benign
sexual expression in the name of protecting women from sexual
harassment. But I'm out of time.
46 Miller Brewing Company was assessed $26.6 million in damages after the
company fired a male executive whom a female employee had accused of sexual
harassment. See James L. Graff, It Was a Joke! An Alleged Sexual Harasser Is
Deemed the Real Victim, TIME, July 28, 1997, at 62. The executive had related
to the employee an episode of Seinfeld in which Seinfeld cannot remember the
name of the woman he is dating, but he knows it rhymes with a part of the
female anatomy. Id. When the employee did not get the joke, the executive
photocopied a dictionary page defining "clitoris" and handed it to her. Id.
47 Stone, The New Psychological Contract, supra note 43, at 9-11
(describing Fordism's impulse to rationalize and standardize the organization of
work).
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